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THE IMPACT OF THE TRADE WARS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ON THE
FUTURE SUCCESS OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Trade wars between the United States and Japan threatened the
newly created World Trade Organization's (WTO) ability to settle
disputes. Japan's refusal to open its automotive market to the United
States caused the United States to threaten sanctions upon many of
Japan's luxury cars. These unilateral sanctions by the United States
arguably violated the WTO Agreement and its dispute resolution mechanisms. After almost two years of threats and negotiations, the two
countries finally arrived at a mutual agreement without having to resort
to a WTO investigation. The outcome of the trade wars between the
United States and Japan will have a tremendous impact on future trade
disputes between the United States and other countries, as well as on
the success of the WTO which was created to handle such disputes.
This comment discusses the trade wars between the United States
and Japan and analyzes whether the threatened unilateral sanctions by
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the United States against Japan violated the newly created WTO and its
dispute resolution mechanisms. Section II is a general overview of the
WTO, including its origin, scope, structure, and dispute resolution
mechanisms. Section III states the pertinent provisions of the Trade Act
of 1974 and gives a brief overview of the sanctions available and procedures used. Section IV begins with the history of the trade wars
between the United States and Japan and proceeds through the various
phases of the dispute that ultimately ended in a settlement between the
countries. Section V covers the implications of the trade wars between
the United States and Japan and whether or not settlement was a victory, not only for the countries, but for the WTO as well.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

The original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
signed in 1947 during negotiations aimed at the establishment of the
International Trade Organization (ITO).' The GATT was intended to
implement and protect the integrity of tariff reduction commitments,
contained trade-related provisions and was to merge with the ITO once
it came into existence.' However, the ITO never came into effect and
thus, there was no operative body in support of the GATT. 3 Since the
ITO failed, the GATT became the "principal international agreement
regulating trade between the nations. "4 The GATT was somewhat
successful in reducing world tariff levels but it failed when it came to
the regulation and administration of world trade relations. It was apparent that the GATT lacked the organizational framework and
mechanisms for dispute resolution, which were desperately needed to
regulate world trade. 5

I. FRANK W. SWACKER ET AL., WORLD TRADE WITHOUT BARRIERS: THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 444 (1995); PIERRE PESCATORE ET
AL., HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 8 (1995). The ITO would have administered trade agreements and governed trade disputes.
2. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 188.
3. SWACKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 444. One of the reasons for the failure of the ITO
was that it was not accepted by the U.S. Congress. It was never brought before Congress for
a vote. Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization:A New Legal Orderfor World
Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 352, 356 (1995).
4. KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (Midway reprint 1977); ROBERT HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD

TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975).
5. Dillon, supra note 3, at 354.
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A.

Scope of the WTO
The WTO was designed to remedy the GATT's organizational and
structural shortcomings. The WTO provided the common institutional
framework for the conduct of trade relations of its members in matters
covered by the GATT and its side agreements6 and any other trade
agreements its Members may execute.' The Uruguay Round Final Act
offered a new GATT 1994 that incorporated the original GATT 1947
and its side agreements.! The GATT 1994 "amends, modifies and
expands many existing GATT obligations through new agreements"
and "also expands obligations of the WTO Members beyond those of
the GATT Contracting Parties," that includes a new agreement for
dispute resolution. 9 The purpose of the WTO "is to encourage world
economic and political convergence through comprehensive trade policy surveillance and integrated dispute settlement systems, developmental assistance to less developed nations, and environmental protection."'" The WTO has the following functions: implement, administer,
and operate covered agreements; provide forums for negotiations between its members; settle disputes that arise under the covered agreements; administer the Trade Policy Review Mechanisms; and achieve
"greater coherence in global economic policy making.""
B. Structure of the WTO
The WTO is a "three-tiered" organization headed by the Ministerial Conference, which consists of representative WTO Members.12 The
WTO Agreement provides that all decision-making powers shall be in
this Conference, which meets every two years. 3 In the interim, the
functions of the Ministerial Conference are to be performed by the
General Council, or executive agency, also consisting of representative

6. PESCATORE ET AL., supra note 1,at 12. These agreements are referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements. See also Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143, 1145 [hereinafter Final
Act].
7. Final Act, supra note 6, at 1144; see also id. at 1145.
8. Dillon, supra note 3, at 358.
9. Id. See also Final Act, supra note 6, at 1153. These new obligations include agreements on financial services through the GATT's accord, intellectual property rights in the
TRIPs Agreement, dispute resolution under the Dispute Resolution Understanding, and national
trade policy review through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. These agreements, including
the GATT, are called Multilateral Trade Agreements and are binding on all WTO Members.

Id. at 1144.
10. Dillon, supra note 3, at 361.
11. Id. at 364; see also Final Act, supra note 6, at 1145.
12. Dillon, supra note 3, at 362.
13. Id. at 363; Final Act, supra note 6, at 1145.
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WTO Members. 4 In addition, the Ministerial Conference functions as
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the Trade Policy Review Body
(TPRB).' 5 The General Council's duties entail the daily functions of
the WTO, and it is basically the "heart and soul" of the WTO. 6 The
WTO will basically continue the practice of decision-making by consensus previously used by the GATT.' 7 However, unless otherwise
provided in the WTO Agreement, if a decision cannot be made by
consensus, the matter should be decided by a majority vote. 8
The DSB is the central part of the dispute resolution mechanism of
the WTO and its functions are performed by the General Council. The
WTO procedures vary depending on the agreement but all agreements
go through the following stages: "consultation, panel investigation and
report, appellate review, decision adoption, and implementation."' 9
There is also a parallel procedure for binding arbitration available if
the parties unanimously agree to follow its procedure. Moreover, the
losing party may request arbitration to determine the appropriateness of
the retaliatory measure to be implemented under the circumstances. 2'
The parties may request a consultation, at which time the DSB mechanisms have not yet been activated, if the dispute concerns the Covered
Agreements. 2' If consultations fail to produce a solution satisfactory to
all parties, there is an automatic establishment of the panel or Appellate Body, unless the members present at the meeting of the DSB decide not to by consensus.22 If the panel convenes, they will investigate
the matter and submit a report to the DSB authorizing any appropriate
action. Unless the DSB rejects the report by consensus and without
amendment, the report must be adopted. Alternatively, the report may
be appealed to the Appellate Body by any party to the dispute. Unless
the DSB vetoes the Appellate Body Decision by consensus, it must be
unconditionally accepted by the parties. 3
The dispute resolution mechanisms of the WTO are a "significant
improvement over the previous GATT dispute resolution system and
solve[s] many of its shortcomings."24 First the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) creates a "unified dispute settlement system,"

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Dillon, supra note 3, at 363; Final Act, supra note 6, at 1145.
Final Act, supra note 6, at 1145.
Id.
Dillon, supra note 3, at 365; Final Act, supra note 6, at 1148.
Dillon, supra note 3, at 365.

19. Id. at 368.
20. Id. at 367; Final Act, supra note 6, at 1226.
21. Dillon, supra note 3, at 368.

22, Id. at 367-68; Final Act, supra note 6, at 1227, 1230-35.
23. Dillon, supra note 3, at 368.
24. Id. at 373.
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alleviating the problems of determining which procedures to apply.
Second, the DSU established the Appellate Body for "review of legal
issues decided by panels." 25 Finally, the DSU ensures panels and Appellate Bodies will be established through a consensus procedure and
adoption of their decisions, without modification.26
The DSU provides the basic framework for the settlement of disputes under the Covered Agreements.2 7 The understanding provides
very specific procedures for dispute resolution. However, there are
cases where additional or special rules may be provided in the individual agreements themselves, in which case the special provisions control .28

1. Consultation Phase
Under the new dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO, there
are four basic phases: consultation, panel phase, Appellate Body Review, and arbitration (an optional alternative procedure). 29 First, when
a member country believes another member "has infringed upon obligations assumed under a Covered Agreement," it may request a consultation.3" The consultation phase could be construed as negotiations
and can continue informally after the panel phase begins.3' Once a
member requests a consultation, the respondent must reply and the
parties must enter into such consultations within thirty days from the
request.3 2 The parties are obligated to "obtain a satisfactory adjustment of the matter"33 in confidential negotiations within sixty days.'
If settlement cannot be reached, the complaining party may request a
35
panel.
In the alternative, parties may unanimously agree to use arbitration, good offices, conciliation, or mediation, which, unlike consultation, may be terminated at any time and by any party. This is different

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Final Act, supra note 6, at 1244. The Covered Agreements include the Multilateral
Trade Agreements, excluding the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, the Dispute Settlement
Understanding and the Plurilateral Agreements. Id.
28. Id. at 1255, 1266.
29. Dillon, supra note 3, at 375.

30. Id. at 381. See also Final Act, supra note 6, at 1228-29. The consultations are intended to secure a positive solution to a dispute and do not simply exist as a formality before the
establishment of a panel. Id. at 1277.
31. Dillon, supra note 3, at 381.
32. Id. See also Final Act, supra note 6, at 1228-29.

33. Final Act, supra note 6, at 1229. See also Dillon, supra note 3, at 381.
34. Negotiations may occur sooner if the case is urgent. Final Act, supra note 6, at 1229.
See also Dillon, supra note 3, at 381.
35. Final Act, supra note 6, at 1229.
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than consultation because arbitration, good offices, conciliation, or
mediation require a mutual agreement of the parties. 36 Once these
avenues have been exhausted, the complaining party may request a
panel,
unless the DSB decides against the use of a panel by consen37
sus.

2. Panel Phase
The panels "conduct confidential deliberations, set deadlines,
receive 'pleadings' and rebuttals, and hear oral arguments" from the
parties.3 8 The panel will issue a written report to the DSB, upon the
completion of discovery and deliberations. This report contains the
panel's "findings of law and fact, a description of the applicability of
relevant provisions, and the basic rationale behind its decision." 3" The
report will be adopted after it is submitted to the DSB. The DSB, by
consensus, can decide not to adopt the report or a party to the dispute
may appeal the decision to the Appellate Body."
3. Appellate Body Review
The appellate procedures may be implemented unless the DSB
rejects them by consensus. Unlike the panel, which applies the facts to
the law, the Appellate Body may only determine questions of law and
legal interpretation. 4 These appellate proceedings are to be confidential and the opinions are submitted by non-bias Members in an anonymous fashion.42 The parties to the dispute may only make written submissions to the Appellate Body 3 that will either uphold, modify, or
reverse the panel's findings." Unless the DSB vetoes the Appellate
Body's findings by consensus, the decision will be adopted.4 5
C. Conclusion
In sum, every member of the WTO has agreed to avail themselves
of these dispute resolution procedures and to be bound by the awards
and decisions of the panel or Appellate Body. Also, the WTO Members must conform their national laws, regulations, and administrative
procedures to those of the WTO Agreement. If a member violates the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Dillon, supra note 3, at 381. See also Final Act, supra note 6, at 1229.
Dillon, supra note 3, at 383.
Id. at 384; see also Final Act, supra note 6, at 1233, 1235.
Dillon, supra note 3, at 385; Final Act, supra note 6, at 1234.
Dillon, supra note 3, at 385; Final Act, supra note 6, at 1235.
Dillon, supra note 3, at 384.
Id. at 385; Final Act, supra note 6, at 1236.
Dillon, supra note 3, at 385.
Id.
Id.
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WTO Agreement's requirements, the member leaves itself open to an
action before the DSB. It is understood by the parties that the WTO
has the ultimate decision of the disputes between its members and
interprets the member's obligations to each other and to the WTO.46
The WTO and its policies do not affect the sovereignty of the
United States to pass laws, enforce existing laws, or set its own standards; only Congress has the power to change the laws of the United
States.47 Therefore, if there are any inconsistencies between the
Agreements or WTO decisions, the United States may decide how the
dispute should be settled. 8
III. THE TRADE ACT OF 1974
primary
mechanisms used by the United States to pry
One of the
open trade markets of other countries is section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974. 4 Section 301 is used to retaliate against foreign countries
accused of unfair trade practices by imposing punitive penalties against
the offending governments.5" The authority to impose sanctions upon
the exports of goods and services is one of the wide variety of retaliatory options available to the United States." Although section 301 is
said to "undermine the multilateralism of the GATT system," it does
result in "a more open trading system and an improved allocation of
resources." 5' 2 Often a country's concern for its reputation is not
enough to induce it to honor its promises to other nations. Sanctions
provide a useful incentive for compliance of reciprocal trade
agreements.53 Also, many trade agreements are not equipped to provide third-party dispute resolution to force nations to comply with the

46. Id. at 391.
47. See The World Trade Organization: Hearings of the House Ways and Means Comm.,
103d Cong., 2d Sess., 7-10 (1994) (statement of Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative).
48. Id.
49. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (as amended by Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301(a), 102 Stat. 1988, 1164-68 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988)) [hereinafter Omnibus Trade Act]. See also Masaichi
Nosaka, U.S. Decides to Impose Sanctions Against Japan, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), May 11,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, DAYOMI File; David M. Pedley, A Definition for
"Unreasonable"in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: A Considerationof the United StatesThailand Tobacco Dispute, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 285 (1991).
50. Evelyn Iritani, New Trade Gripe May be More Strain than Gain; News Analysis: White
House Probe into Kodak's Claim Japan Has Closed its Film Market May Bruise Multilateral
Trade, L.A. TIMEs, July 4, 1995, at DI. See also Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral
Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Casefor Section 301, 23 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 263 (1992).

51. Sykes, supra note 50, at 288.
52. Id. at 266.
53. Id. at 270.
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agreements. Therefore, sanctions provide an alternative that allows the
United States to take matters into its own hands.54
Section 301(a) 5 is mandatory in nature, requiring the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) to "take action" when it is determined that the United States is being denied rights under an existing
trade agreement.' Section 301(b)57 is discretionary when there is no
express agreement, giving the USTR the option to take appropriate
action "if an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. Commerce." 58
The goal of section 301 is to "provide the President with 'negotiating leverage' to 'insure fair and equitable conditions for United States
commerce' and 'to eliminate [trade] barriers . . . and . . . distortions . . . on a reciprocal basis."' 59 In order to further these goals, the
President has been authorized to take punitive actions against any
"foreign government act, policy, or practice that burdens or restricts
54. Id. at 266.
55. The amended § 301(a) provides:
(1) If the United States Trade Representative determines under
§ 304(a)(1) . . that
(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are being
denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country(i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise
denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce;
the Trade Representative shall take action authorized in subsection (c),
subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President regarding any
such action, and shall take all other appropriate and feasible action
within the power of the President that the President may direct the
Trade Representative to take under this subsection, to enforce such
rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or practice.
Omnibus Trade Act § 1301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a) (1988).
56. Pedley, supra note 49, at 287.
57. Section 301(b) provides:
If the Trade Representative determines under section 301(a)(1) .
that(i)
an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable
or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce, and
(2)
action by the United States is appropriate, the Trade Representative shall take all appropriate and feasible action authorized under subsection
(c), subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President regarding any
such action, and all other appropriate and feasible action within the power of
the President that the President may direct the Trade Representative to take
under this subsection, to obtain the elimination of the act, policy or practice.
Omnibus Trade Act § 1301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (b) (1988).
58. Id.
59. Pedley, supra note 49, at 288; S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 164, reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7136, 7302.
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and that is determined to be "unjustifiable,"
United States Commerce"
"unreasonable" ' or "discriminatory." ' 6' The threat of unilateral sanctions can serve as a valuable and important tool in trade disputes between countries.
IV. THE TRADE WARS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

The United States has become the largest debtor nation in the
world due to its annual trade deficits sustained with other countries.
The best example of this deficit can be demonstrated by the United
States' relationship with Japan. In 1994, the United States had a trade
loss with Japan in excess of fifty billion dollars, resulting from
"antiforeign and unfair trade practices" adopted by Japan.62 Japan has
refused to open its automotive market to the United States thereby
creating a tremendous loss in trade with the United States." In 1994,
the trade gap between the United States and Japan reached sixty-six
billion, with autos and auto parts comprising nearly sixty percent of the
United States' deficit.'
Several factors perpetuate the auto dispute between the United
States and Japan. First, Americans seem to prefer Japanese-made automobiles and, as a result, buy more Japanese cars than Japanese buy
American-made cars. This results not only in the Japanese having a
tremendous surplus in autos and auto parts but also the confidence in
knowing that Americans prefer Japanese products.65 Second, American auto manufacturers have been unable to offer many products for
sale in Japan that compete with the Japanese market. Specifically,
"[e]ighty percent of the Japanese automobile market is for cars with

60. An "unreasonable" practice has been defined by statute as one that "while not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent with the international legal rights of the United States, is
otherwise [deemed] unfair [or unreasonable]." Pedley, supra note 49, at 289; 19 U.S.C.
§ 241 l(d)(3)(A) (1988).
61. Pedley, supra note 49, at 288; 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1988). The retaliatory measures
authorized in this section give the President the power to:
(A) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of [or refrain from
proclaiming] benefits of trade agreement concessions to carry out a trade
agreement with the foreign country... ;
(B) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and...
fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country for such time as
the Trade Representative [deems] appropriate ....
19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1) (1988).
62. SWACKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 8.
63. U.S. Filing Formal Complaint in Trade Dispute With Japan, BALTIMORE SUN, May
10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, BALSUN File [hereinafter U.S. Filing].
64. Id.
65. See Brent Scowcroft, Auto Face-off and LeadershipRole in Trade, WASH. TIMES, June
25, 1995, at BI.
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engines under 2000 cc," and American manufactures have traditionally
manufactured automobiles with larger engines.' Finally, barriers such
as "Japanese governmental regulations and business practices discourage imports of automobiles" to Japan. 67 American manufacturers and
other nations' competitors experience difficulties in selling their autos
and auto parts in Japan. This final barrier to the trade could be easily
removed with a little cooperation by the Japanese government.68
The United States has continually requested that Japan remove this
unfair competition, but to no avail.69 However, now that the United
States and Japan are both members of the WTO, Japan will be forced
to remove this unfair competition or receive sanctions by the WTO. It
is projected that once Japan (and other countries) are forced to remove
unfair trade competitions with the United States, the annual trade defi"decrease drastically. "70
cit will
As part of the negotiations between the countries,
the Clinton
Administration sought the following promises from Japanese
automakers: to purchase more American-made auto parts in their U.S.
and Japanese factories, to increase the "number of Japanese dealerships
stocking American cars," and to relax regulations that impede "the sale
of replacement auto parts at Japanese repair shops."'" However, the
Japanese negotiators did not agree and refused to be responsible for
reaching any target goals. Instead, the Japanese claim they merely
agreed to a voluntary "partial deregulation of their inspection system"
and to informing Japanese auto dealers that they may voluntarily sell
foreign cars through their dealerships without "permission or interference from Japanese auto makers. ' 7 Japan claims these goals are voluntary in nature, and, therefore, may not be enforced under U.S. trade
laws if the goals are not reached.73 However, the United States felt
Japan's failure to reach these goals by a "wide margin would be indicative of the continuation of restrictive trade practices" thereby making
continuation of these unfair trade practices actionable.74
The Clinton Administration initially set a deadline of September
30, 1994, to impose unilateral trade sanctions under section 301"5
66. Id.
67. Id.

68. Id.
69. See U.S. Filing, supra note 63.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., The Looking-Glass Deal; Japan and the U.S. Leave the
Tough Trade Questionsfor Later, WASH. POST, July 2, 1995, at Cl.
73. Id.
74. Id. The United States also believed the attention generated by these goals would pressure Japan to meet these goals. Id.
75. See U.S. Super 301 Action Against Japan's Automotive Industry Would Violate GATT,
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against Japan in the auto and auto parts sectors, believing the only way
to obtain access to the Japanese markets was to "take some action
against their imports. 7 6 These sanctions would be aimed at over one
billion dollars in Japanese products such as "Japanese luxury cars,
minivans and autoparts. "77 Since Japan heavily depends on its luxury
car industry to survive, this would clearly take its toll on the Japanese
economy7" by pricing these models "out of the market."'79 It appeared that Japan would be forced to either cave in and open its markets or be forced to take this dispute to the WTO for settlement.
A study by the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association released on September 19, 1994, found that these sanctions would not
only violate the GATT, but trigger trade confrontation with Japan. This
would consequently damage the world trading system and the new
dispute resolution mechanisms of the WTO Agreement that the United
States "fought hard to obtain.""0 Similarly, even though other countries supported the United States' idea to open Japan's closed markets,
they were concerned that these disputes would destroy the authority of
the WTO.8 ' It is clear that the United States' imposition of unilateral
sanctions against Japan violates the GATT, and the dispute resolution
mechanism of the WTO that expressly prohibits unilateral sanctions.82
Japan claimed the WTO had established a system for resolving international trade disputes that should have been followed by the United
States, whereas the United States insisted that it has the right to impose
sanctions under section 301.83
Although it was believed that settlement between the nations would
occur,8 4 on May 9, 1995, the Senate passed, by a vote of eighty-eight

Undermine World Trade Says JAMA, U.S. NEWSWIRE, INC., Sept. 19, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, USNWR File.
76. U.S. Filing, supra note 63.
77. Michelle Magee, U.S. Sanctions Would Hobble Japan'sEconomy, S.F. CHRON., May
18, 1995, at Al. These luxury models would include Toyota Lexus, Nissan Infinity, Honda
Acura, Mazda Millenia and Mitsubishi Diamante, whose total exports in 1994 amounted to
one-tenth of Japan's overall trade surplus with the United States. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81.

William Drozdiak, U.S. Fails to Win EU Support for Anti-Japan Trade Sanctions,

WASH. POST, May 25, 1995, at A34.
82. Acura to Washington; Sanctions Clobber Americans, PR Newswire, June 8, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library, PRNEWS File.
83. Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 49, § 1301(a).
84. U.S. Filing, supra note 63. A trade specialist at the Economic Strategic Institute in

Washington believed sanctions were unlikely to manifest using as an example the negotiations
between the United States and China regarding protection of U.S. copyrights wherein the
parties settled immediately before punitive tariffs on Chinese products were to take effect. See
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to eight, a resolution that endorsed the use of unilateral sanctions if
negotiations were not successful.8" The United States felt, based on
past experience, that Japan would only open their markets when faced
with punitive sanctions.86
However, if the bilateral negotiations between the United States
and Japan were unsuccessful and the United States imposed sanctions
on Japan, the Japanese Government would have been forced to take the
case to the WTO."7 Had it gone this far, Japan would have probably
prevailed since the United States, under the WTO Agreement, was
under an obligation to pursue a remedy with the WTO before imposing
unilateral trade sanctions.88
The Clinton Administration was criticized for seeking a commitment from the Japanese government to force Japanese businesses to
buy a specified quality of autos and auto parts from the United States.
This was thought to be inconsistent "with the idea of free trade." 89
Members of the Republican Party felt a better plan for establishing free
trade between the countries would be the negotiations of a bilateral
dispute resolution agreement between the United States and Japan.9"
In May, 1995, trade talks broke off mainly because of the demand
on Japanese automakers to commit to future purchases of Americanmade auto parts. This demand was rejected by Japan because it was
felt to violate the WTO's basic market regulations and discriminate
against other nations. Also, Japan took the position that the United
States' threat of unilateral sanctions was repugnant to the WTO rules
for dispute resolution and that the "U.S. request to discuss the Most
Favored Nation (MFN) procedures only on U.S. cars and auto
parts . . . would violate the principle that MFN treatment must be
extended to other nations as well." 9' The Japanese Government filed a
complaint with the WTO upon receiving an announcement that the
United States would impose "punitive tariffs on [thirteen] of Japan's

also Nosaka, supra note 49.
85. U.S. Filing, supra note 63.
86. Prestowitz, supra note 72, at CI.
87. Yomiuri Shimbun, Government May Ask WTO to Tackle Auto Dispute, DAILY
YOMIURI (Japan), Apr. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, DAYOMI File; see also
Filing, supra note 63.
In fact, once sanctions are announced, Japan intends to terminate the negotiations and
bring the dispute to the WTO. See Nosaka, supra note 49, at 1.
88. U.S. Filing, supra note 63.
89. Republican Raps U.S. Policy on Japan Auto Issue, Jiji Press Ticker Service, Apr. 4,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, JII File.

90. Id.
91.

Mitsuhiko Morimoto, Japan Advised to Settle Auto Dispute Through Talks, DAILY
(Japan), May 22, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, DAYOMI File.

YOMIURI
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luxury cars."92 The United States also filed a counter-complaint with
the WTO in an effort to prove that Japan's unfair trade practices also
violated the "spirit of the WTO". 93
V. IMPLICATIONS OF FILING A COMPLAINT WITH THE WTO
A. The Impact on the WTO
Japan's decision to file a complaint with the WTO had its advantages and disadvantages. One positive effect was that Japan could
obtain the opinion of a third party regarding their dispute with the
United States, where in the past, the two countries had been forced into
compromise.9 4 The WTO may also be used as a forum that will enable other countries to better understand the dispute between the United
States and Japan."
Other countries also benefit from the United States and Japan filing
their complaint with the WTO. European nations had concerns that
MFN principles might be overlooked during the wars between the
United States and Japan, while other nations, such as the Asian nations, were concerned that once the dispute was settled, the United
States would demand that they open their markets as well.96 With the
WTO solving the trade dispute between United States and Japan, the
results were said to have been "internationally acceptable." 9 Finally,
filing a complaint would establish international trade rules.9"
On the other hand, it was indicated that the United States and
Japan might be better off settling their dispute through their own negotiations. Because the newly created WTO does not yet have the experience and ability to function effectively, the United States and Japan
would be testing its ability to settle their dispute. Since Japan was more
than likely to win its case, the United States could have been forced
into leaving the WTO on the grounds that it received unfair treatment.'
The WTO's Director General, Renato Ruggiero, stated that he
would prefer to not have the trade wars between the United States and
Japan as the first test of the WTO's authority. I0" Ruggiero feared the

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Drozdiak, supra note 81, at A34.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Drozdiak, supra note 81, at A34.
99. Nosaka, supra note 49. This may occur because the WTO permits its members to
withdraw their membership if they feel they have received "unfair treatment more than three
times in five years." Id.
100. See David E. Sanger, U.S. and Japan Told to Solve Trade Dispute, N.Y. TIMEs, June
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newly formed WTO would be torn apart by the war between the countries, and he feared the countries would not comply with the WTO's
rulings'' even though both countries agreed they would. He also expressed his concern that the United States was "no longer confident"
with its leadership on international economic issues or about relying on
institutions, such as the WTO, to solve its trading problems with other
nations. 02
B. The Impact of the Trade Wars with Other Nations
The trade wars between the United States and Japan have caused
tension with other open trading nations. As long as the United States
applies unilateral pressures to other nations, it undermines the support
for the open multilateral trading system that is crucial to the world
economy." 3 Japan may lose the support of European and Asian nations, who depend on open trade, and who will be inclined to side with
the United States on the issue of unfair trade practices, even though
they will be critical of the threatened sanctions."°4 The United States,
on the other hand, runs the risk of being isolated from other countries.
Although the European nations overall were pleased with the United
States' handling of these trade disputes, the Europeans agreed with
Japan that the punitive tariffs "could trigger a dangerous round of trade
wars."'0 5 The European nations also fear that any compromise to
open Japan's market for autos and auto parts would financially hurt the
European countries, in favor of the "Big Three American""06 car
makers. 0 7 Korea also has a stake in the WTO's success and will likely be affected by the weakening of the WTO and multilateral trading
system. 101

14, 1995, at D1.
101. id.
102. Id. Apparently this fear stemmed from the United States' decision to impose unilateral
punitive sanctions against Japan while also filing a complaint against Japan with the WTO.
103. See South Korea: U.S. Trade Tensions with Japan and their Implications for Korea,
KOREA ECON. DAILY, June 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File
[hereinafter Implications for Korea].
104. Id.
105. See Morimoto, supra note 91.
106. The "Big Three" carmakers include General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. See Ben
Okamoto, Auto Dispute Was Rooted in Politics, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), July I, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, DAYOMI File.
107. See Morimoto, supra note 91.
108. Implications for Korea, supra note 103.
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C. Was Settlement a Victory?
The United States and Japan reached an eleventh-hour agreement
on June 28, 1995, after almost two years of disagreement and seven
days of intense negotiations." The United States agreed not to impose sanctions if Japan agreed to open its auto and auto parts markets
to U.S. manufacturers. President Clinton was pleased because the
agreement was "specific," "measurable," and would "achieve concrete
results.""' The deal will generally increase the sales of Americanmade autos and auto parts in Japan, create thousands of new jobs for
Americans, expand the number of dealerships selling American-made
automobiles in Japan, and expand the number of Japanese-made automobiles in the United States."'
The question remains, however, whether or not this settlement was
a victory for the countries and for the WTO. The United States was
successful in closing its gap in trade with Japan. However, the United
States has been highly criticized for its threat of sanctions against Japan
and has managed to turn other countries against it. The tactics used by
the United States, according to most trade specialists, clearly violated
the WTO rules." 2
On the other hand, arguments can be made that the U.S. strategy
was successful in meeting its goals. First, the Clinton Administration
never actually imposed sanctions and therefore did not "technically
violate the WTO" agreement." 3 The fact that an agreement was
reached with Japan proves that the United States was dedicated to its
obligations under the WTO." 4 It could also be said that the United
States' settlement with Japan was a victory because if this dispute had
been taken to the WTO, not only would the United States' sanctions
against Japan had been lifted, but the United States could have received
counter-sanctions by Japan." 5 Finally, the WTO allows cross-retaliation by the winner of the dispute. Had the United States lost, which
was almost certain to happen, then Japan could have sanctioned the
United States, furthering the trade wars and ultimately imposing taxes
on the United States' taxpayers. "6 Another future problem avoided by
the agreement is the threat that the tariffs, had they been imposed,
109. Clinton Hails U.S.-Japan Car Trade Accord, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Japan), June 28,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. See also James Sheehan, Free Trade Casualties, WASH. TIMEs, July 5, 1995, at
AI5.
113. Sheehan, supra note 112, at AI5.
114. Id.
115. Id.

116. Id.
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would have forced "layoffs at Japanese car dealerships" thereby creating the risk of "Japanese retaliation."' 17
There are mixed feelings as to whether the settlement of the U.S.Japan dispute was a victory for the WTO. This would have been the
first major case to test the waters of the WTO's dispute resolution
mechanisms. Instead, the WTO was deprived of this opportunity." 8
Moreover, there is the fear that the countries lacked respect for the
WTO and therefore would not abide by its rulings. If the WTO does
not gain respect of the Member countries, it is unclear how it will be
able to regulate trade between the nations.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The WTO Agreement clearly sets forth the procedures to be utilized by its member countries when a trade dispute arises, and it clearly forbids the use of unilateral sanctions. However, the United States
argued that the WTO dispute resolution procedures were not capable of
resolving this type of dispute, claiming it had the authority under section 301 to threaten unilateral sanctions against Japan. The question of
whether or not the United States would have violated the WTO Agreement by imposing unilateral sanctions is a moot point since the countries have reached an agreement. However, the effect of the trade wars
between the United States and Japan will have an effect upon how the
countries will interact regarding trade disputes in the future and as to
the success of the WTO.
Had the United States and Japan taken this dispute to the WTO, it
may have forced the WTO to deal with a problem that it was unprepared to handle. Also, the United States and Japan may not have complied with the orders set down by the WTO. This lack of disrespect
would have been fatal to the newly created organization. Finally, the
United States argues that the WTO was not specific about handling this
type of trade dispute, therefore they were justified in threatening sanctions under section 301. Possibly the WTO will reform its Agreement
to include these types of disputes in the future. Until then, the fate of
the WTO is undecided.
Heather L. Drake
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